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Abstract The public releases of the 2004 and 2005 HMDA data have
engendered a lively debate over the pricing of mortgage credit
and its implications regarding the treatment of minority mortgage
borrowers. This research uses aggregated proprietary data
provided by lenders and an endogenous switching regression
model to estimate the probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage, and annual percentage rate (APR) conditional on
getting either a subprime or prime mortgage. The ﬁndings reveal
that up to 90% of the African American APR gap, and 85% of
the Hispanic APR gap, is attributable to observable differences
in underwriting, costing, and market factors that appropriately
explain mortgage pricing differentials. Although any potential
discrimination is problematic and should be addressed, the
analysis suggests that little of the aggregate differences in APRs
paid by minority and non-minority borrowers are appropriately
attributed to differential treatment.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting requirements were changed in
2004 to require lenders for the ﬁrst time to provide information on the difference
between the annual percentage rate (APR) and a comparable Treasury rate for all
loans above a rate spread-reporting threshold.1 The Federal Reserve Board
publicly released these initial data in September 2005. Similar data for loans
originated in 2005 were released in September 2006.
The 2004 and 2005 HMDA data show that loans to minority borrowers have a
substantially higher probability of exceeding the rate-spread reporting hurdle,
suggesting that, on average, minority borrowers pay higher APRs for their
mortgages than do non-minority borrowers. This observation has engendered a
lively debate over its possible implications regarding differential treatment.2 Partly
on the basis of these data, regulatory agencies have referred several pricing cases
to the Department of Justice. In a separate action, Countrywide, one of the nation’s
largest lenders, reached a settlement with the New York Ofﬁce of the Attorney
General based on investigation of Countrywide’s pricing practices.3400  Courchane
This paper provides a unique perspective on this debate because of the access to
data not generally available to the public. Speciﬁcally, a number of lenders have
allowed pooling of their records into an anonymous data set that includes detailed
loan-level information on their 2004 and 2005 originations. These data allow
exploration of the pricing of mortgage loans across minority and non-minority
borrowers at a deeper level of detail than is possible with HMDA data alone. In
particular, the data allow rough approximation of the work of regulators as they
analyze apparently unexplained pricing differentials uncovered in the HMDA data.
Regulators use HMDA data to allocate efﬁciently their investigative activities—
attention is focused typically on lenders with relatively larger pricing differentials
that cannot be fully explained by HMDA data alone. However, once lenders are
targeted for additional reviews, regulators signiﬁcantly modify how they conduct
their investigations. First, rather than restricting their attention to rate-spreads for
loans above the rate-spread reporting hurdle, regulators explicitly focus on
mortgage prices (generally APRs) for all loans.4 Second, regulators dramatically
increase the control variables used in their statistical analyses, including variables
used in underwriting loans, as well as variables used to account for market factors
that can affect pricing outcomes.
The data uniquely allow approximation of this second-level analysis of regulators,
albeit at a national level using pooled data rather than separately for individual
lenders.5 Speciﬁcally, the data include APR, typical underwriting variables such
as loan-to-value ratios (LTV), debt-to-income ratios (DTI), and FICO scores, as
well as other variables that likely affect mortgage pricing, such as documentation
status, the existence of prepayment penalties, and sourcing channel. Identiﬁcation
of whether the lenders in the sample operate primarily in the subprime or prime
markets is also possible.6
The data show that there are large pricing differentials to explain. For example,
the difference between the mean APR of African American borrowers and the
mean APR of White non-Hispanic borrowers is 120 basis points in 2004 and 128
basis points in 2005, and the equivalent difference between Hispanic and White
non-Hispanic borrowers is 56 basis points in 2004 and 74 basis points in 2005.
Not surprisingly, APRs are substantially higher in the subprime market, and much
of the explanation for why minority borrowers tend to have higher APRs than
non-minority borrowers is because minority borrowers disproportionately take out
subprime loans.
An endogenous switching regression model is used to estimate APR separately in
the prime and subprime markets because the supply and, arguably, the demand
functions in the two markets are quite different.7 A full set of explanatory variables
is used to largely explain the differential tendency of minority borrowers to obtain
subprime loans. Up to all but about 10 basis points of the difference in mean
APRs between African American, Hispanic, and White non-Hispanic borrowers
can also be explained.The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  401
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The explanatory variables included in the models are by necessity parsimonious,
because commonality is required in all the data elements across lenders.
Additional data including a complete set of appropriate explanatory variables
might even more fully explain differences in minority and non-minority mortgage
outcomes. This suggests that widespread and consistent differential treatment of
African American and Hispanic mortgage borrowers is highly unlikely to be the
primary cause of the observed raw differences in mean APR paid by minority and
non-minority borrowers.
 Previous Research
The uniqueness of the data means that no previous researchers have precisely
considered the questions addressed in this paper. However, there have been several
studies that have looked at the question of whether minority borrowers pay
differentially higher prices for mortgage loans. For example, two recent Federal
Reserve Board Bulletin articles provide a comprehensive discussion of the newly
expanded 2004 and 2005 HMDA data.8 The authors use HMDA and a secondary
data source to conclude that much, but not all of the minority and non-minority
differences in rate-spread reporting incidence can be explained by observable
factors associated with underwriting and market dynamics. The authors’ data
constrains their analysis to focus on the incidence of rate-spread reportable
mortgages, and the severity of the rate-spread conditional on incidence, rather
than directly analyzing mortgage prices or APRs.
Two other recent papers analyze the newest HMDA data. The Center for
Responsible Lending (CRL) released a recent study that measures the effect of
race and ethnicity on the price of subprime mortgages.9 The CRL study uses 2004
HMDA data merged with a proprietary data set, resulting in a sample of about
177,000 subprime loans. Their analysis includes all the HMDA variables, as well
as such credit-related variables as FICO scores, LTVs, documentation status, and
term to maturity. The CRL study ﬁnds that both African American and Hispanic
borrowers are more likely to obtain higher-priced loans. Again, however, the focus
is on the incidence of reported rate-spreads.
The Consumer Federation of American (CFA) also studied mortgage pricing,
releasing in December of the past two years analyses that ﬁnd that women,
particularly African American women, are more likely to obtain subprime loans,
and thus pay higher rates.10 The CFA study relies solely on HMDA, and therefore
includes no lender- or borrower-speciﬁc underwriting or mortgage information.
Nor do they have available APRs.
Several papers in the past few years have also focused on borrowers ‘‘choice’’ of
prime versus subprime mortgages. Courchane, Surette, and Zorn (2004) ﬁnd that
this choice is inﬂuenced signiﬁcantly by non-ﬁnancial factors, and that there exists
considerable ability to transition between prime and subprime markets as life402  Courchane
events or credit events vary. Pennington-Cross (2003) ﬁnds that credit risk factors
are the most important determinants of market choice. LaCour-Little (2006)
focuses on the home purchase preferences of low- and moderate-income
borrowers, and ﬁnds that individual credit characteristics and ﬁnancial factors
drive mortgage product choice. None of these three studies focuses on pricing or
APR.
This paper combines and extends these two, related strains of research. Using an
endogenous switching regression framework, the probability of borrowers getting
mortgages in the prime or subprime markets, and their APRs conditional on the
market in which they obtain mortgage loans, are simultaneously estimated. The
data include APR, as well as an unusually rich set of explanatory variables that
likely affect lenders’ underwriting and pricing decisions.
 Data
Despite its recent enhancement, regulators recognize that the HMDA data need
extensive supplementation in order to accurately assess whether or not similarly
situated borrowers are treated similarly. As part of fair lending investigations, the
regulatory agencies have the right to examine all of the relevant underwriting and
pricing data pertinent to mortgage lending decisions, as well as all the necessary
information about borrower characteristics. The data from fair lending
examinations are protected by examination privilege and, typically, do not make
it into the research arena.
Lenders generated the proprietary data used here in the analysis for fair lending
purposes. Restrictions on the use of the data are designed to shield the identity
of borrowers and lenders, but the data do include loan-level pricing and
underwriting factors rarely available to researchers. These data provide for the ﬁrst
time, therefore, an opportunity to conduct a large scale and relatively complete
study of the potential differential treatment of minority mortgage borrowers.
Lenders’ motivations for collecting and providing these data vary, but range from
proactive concerns regarding the fair lending integrity of their business operations
to the necessity of responding to fair lending inquiries by federal regulators. The
data include over one million loan-level records of originations in 2004 and 2005,
from a total of 22 lenders/subsidiaries (nine prime and nine subprime lenders/
subsidiaries for mortgages originated in 2004, and eight prime and eight subprime
lenders/subsidiaries for mortgages originated in 2005). The lenders and
subsidiaries in the data self-identify as either prime or subprime, so markets can
be differentiated at a lender- or subsidiary-level rather than at the mortgage loan-
level more typical of most recent HMDA analysis. The choice in this matter
reﬂects the continuing difference in prime and subprime market dynamics, and
the fact that lenders or their subsidiaries almost always specialize in one or the
other of the two markets.11 As a consequence, all mortgages originated by a self-
identiﬁed subprime lender are considered to be subprime mortgages while allThe Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  403
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mortgages originated by a self-identiﬁed prime lender are considered to be prime
mortgages.
The analyses are limited to ﬁrst lien, single-family, conventional purchase-money
and reﬁnance mortgages.12 The analyses are also limited to African American,
Hispanic, and White non-Hispanic borrowers. To ensure that these categories are
mutually exclusive, and to allow for the analysis of marginal impacts of race/
ethnicity, African American borrowers are restricted to those that have a non-
Hispanic ethnicity and exclude from Hispanic borrowers those with a non-White
race.
The proprietary lender data include all HMDA data elements, as well as a variety
of loan speciﬁc underwriting and pricing characteristics. Speciﬁcally, data are
available for APR, borrower race/ethnicity, borrower gender, FICO score, LTV,
DTI, loan amount, contract rate type (ﬁxed or adjustable), loan purpose (purchase
money or reﬁnance), occupancy status (owner-occupied or not owner-occupied),
documentation status (full documentation or not full documentation), existence of
a prepayment penalty, loan term to maturity, and origination channel (wholesale
or retail). In addition, the data are appended to select census and aggregated
HMDA variables at a state-county-tract level, including the tract-level Herﬁndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), tract-level denial rate, tract-level educational distribution,
tract-level percentage owner-occupied, and tract-level percentage of subprime
originations in the previous year.13
The data come from a ‘‘convenience’’ sample rather than a random sample.
Despite the non-random sampling of the data construction, the distributions of key
variables are reasonably consistent with those of the full HMDA data in the
equivalent years.14 Exhibit 1 shows these raw comparisons.15 Note, for example,
that the percentage minority is within about four percentage points of that in
HMDA, although African American borrowers tend to be over-represented in the
subprime population while Hispanic borrowers are generally somewhat under-
represented. The loan purpose and occupancy status distributions are very similar
in both data, generally within two percentage points of each other. The income
and loan amount distributions are also reasonably similar, but with wider variance
across the two data. There is a somewhat larger difference, however, in the rate-
spread distributions. Speciﬁcally, subprime lenders are more likely than the
HMDA subprime lender population to originate rate-spread reportable loans, while
prime lenders originate fewer rate-spread reportable loans than do average HMDA
prime lenders. This likely results from having subprime lenders in the data that
are more specialized in subprime lending than is generally the case in the HMDA
population.
Post-sampling weights are constructed to increase the conﬁdence with inference
is drawn to the HMDA population, and then they are applied to the proprietary
lender data throughout the analyses. To create these weights, 576 mutually
exclusive cells were created by interacting discrete categories of variables common













Exhibit 1  Comparison of HMDA and Proprietary Lender Data
2004 2005
Subprime Loans Prime Loans Subprime Loans Prime Loans
Variable Name Variable Value HMDA Lender Data HMDA Lender Data HMDA Lender Data HMDA Lender Data
Race/Ethnicity African American 17.11% 19.43% 5.83% 4.32% 19.68% 24.24% 6.55% 5.76%
Hispanic 14.77% 12.38% 7.82% 5.98% 19.45% 19.52% 9.77% 8.39%
White non-Hispanic 68.12% 68.19% 86.36% 89.70% 60.88% 56.24% 83.68% 85.85%
Income Income  $20,000 1.95% 1.76% 1.43% 0.93% 1.38% 0.92% 1.21% 1.21%
$20,000  Income  $200,000 93.64% 91.40% 86.72% 79.54% 94.25% 95.60% 85.41% 88.02%
$200,000  Income 2.65% 2.69% 6.35% 8.04% 3.08% 3.41% 7.43% 6.83%
Unknown Income 1.76% 4.15% 5.50% 11.49% 1.29% 0.08% 5.95% 3.93%
Loan Amount Loan Amount  $100,000 30.65% 27.64% 25.96% 23.63% 24.49% 20.72% 21.16% 21.94%
$100,000  Loan Amount  Loan Limit 61.72% 63.87% 64.18% 64.03% 66.46% 68.72% 67.41% 67.04%
Loan Limit  Loan Amount 7.63% 8.49% 9.86% 12.34% 9.05% 10.56% 11.43% 11.02%
Loan Purpose Purchase Money 32.98% 34.63% 45.12% 47.66% 39.02% 46.53% 49.80% 48.26%
Reﬁnance 67.02% 65.37% 54.88% 52.34% 60.98% 53.47% 50.20% 51.74%
Occupancy Status Owner-Occupied 90.31% 90.99% 87.64% 89.86% 91.10% 91.79% 85.58% 86.58%
Not Owner-Occupied 9.69% 9.01% 12.36% 10.14% 8.90% 8.21% 14.42% 13.42%
Reported Rate Spread No 49.33% 38.34% 96.10% 98.75% 17.47% 7.40% 91.61% 96.45%
Yes 50.67% 61.66% 3.90% 1.25% 82.53% 92.60% 8.39% 3.55%The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  405
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Exhibit 2  Outcome Comparisons Without Controls







African American 7.22 43.60% 8.48 6.25
Hispanic 6.58 33.26% 7.86 5.94
White non-Hispanic 6.03 17.22% 7.83 5.65
2004 African American minus
White non-Hispanic
1.20 26.38% 0.65 0.60
Hispanic minus White
non-Hispanic
0.56 16.04% 0.03 0.29
African American 7.99 44.54% 9.57 6.72
Hispanic 7.45 34.73% 9.24 6.50
White non-Hispanic 6.71 16.28% 9.07 6.25
2005 African American minus
White non-Hispanic
1.28 28.26% 0.50 0.47
Hispanic minus White
non-Hispanic
0.74 18.44% 0.17 0.25
ethnicity (African American, Hispanic, and White non-Hispanic), four income
(less than $20,000, between $20,000 and $200,000, greater than $200,000, and
unknown), three loan amounts (less than $100,000, between $100,000, and the
conforming limit, and greater than the conforming limit), two loan purposes
(purchase and reﬁnance), two owner-occupancy (owner-occupant and investor),
and two reported rate-spreads (yes and no) categories.16 The distributions of the
proprietary lender and HMDA mortgages over each of the mutually exclusive
buckets are then calculated and used to create post-sampling weights by dividing
the percentage of the HMDA data in each cell by the percentage of the proprietary
data in the equivalent cell. Finally, the appropriate post-sampling weight for each
of the individual buckets is applied to all mortgages in that bucket.17
The ﬁrst data step is to use these post-sampling weights to provide the basic
comparisons that motivate the study. Unlike HMDA, the data allow direct
comparison of the APRs of all mortgages originated by the included lenders.
Therefore, four market outcomes (mean APR, percentage with a subprime loan,
mean subprime APR, and mean prime APR) are shown for each of the borrower
race/ethnicity categories, and the African American and Hispanic outcomes are
compared to those of White non-Hispanic borrowers.
Exhibit 2 provides these comparisons, and clearly shows that minority borrowers
pay higher APRs than non-minority borrowers. In 2004, the mean APR of African
American borrowers is 120 basis points above White non-Hispanic borrowers and
the mean APR of Hispanic borrowers is 56 basis points above White non-Hispanic
borrowers.18 In 2005, these differences grow to 128 basis points above White non-406  Courchane
Hispanic borrowers for African American borrowers, and 74 basis points above
White non-Hispanic borrowers for Hispanic borrowers.
These APR differences can be decomposed into two factors. Mean APRs are
substantially higher in the subprime market—generally on the order of about 200
basis points in 2004 and about 275 basis points in 2005—and minority borrowers
disproportionately obtain loans in the higher priced market. For example, African
American and Hispanic borrowers are 26.38 and 16.04 percentage points,
respectively, more likely than White non-Hispanic borrowers to obtain a subprime
mortgage in 2004, and 28.26 and 18.44 percentage points more likely in 2005.
This disproportionate propensity for minority borrowers to obtain loans in the
higher priced subprime market explains roughly one-half the APR difference
between minority and non-minority borrowers in 2004, and roughly two-thirds the
difference in 2005.19
The higher APRs paid by minority borrowers in both the subprime and prime
markets is the other factor explaining the overall higher APRs paid by minority
borrowers. For example, in 2004, the mean APR of African American and
Hispanic subprime borrowers is 65 basis points and 3 basis points, respectively,
above that of White non-Hispanic borrowers, and in the prime market it is above
White non-Hispanic borrowers by 60 basis points and 29 basis points, respectively.
In 2005, these differences decline for African American borrowers but increase
for Hispanic borrowers. Speciﬁcally, in 2005 the subprime market differences are
50 basis points and 17 basis points, respectively, for African American and
Hispanic borrowers, and 47 basis points and 25 basis points, respectively, in the
prime market.
The substantially higher mortgage prices paid by minority borrowers are troubling,
regardless of why they occur. Crafting an appropriate public policy response,
however, depends critically on causality. The extent to which differential treatment
of minority borrowers may contribute to these outcomes is discussed in the
remainder of the paper.
 Modeling and Econometric Issues
Simplistically stated, fair lending laws applicable to mortgage lending require that
similar borrowers be treated similarly (concerns of disparate treatment), and that
there be a valid business justiﬁcation for any similar treatment that differentially
impacts minority borrowers (concerns of disparate impact).20 Outcomes such as
those observed in Exhibit 2 raise potential concerns about both issues.
Determining the potential role of disparate impact in explaining these results
requires comparing APRs to business performance measures such as defaults,
losses or proﬁtability, and assessing whether the higher APRs paid by minority
borrowers are justiﬁed by appropriate business necessity.21 A full disparate impact
assessment, therefore, requires business performance variables not included in theThe Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  407
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data. As a consequence, the analysis cannot deﬁnitively check for all forms of
potential discrimination.
Moreover, although the data are loan-level, they combine in an anonymous fashion
loans from many lenders. The analysis, therefore, focuses on aggregate market
impacts and not on potential discriminatory actions or outcomes of individual
lenders or borrowers. While discrimination is problematic even if it affects only
a single borrower, the task of assessing such individual impacts is left to others.
An endogenous switching regression framework is used to model the
determination of mortgage market type (subprime or prime), and the determination
of APR conditional on market. Applying these models to the data, equations are
simultaneously estimated for the probability of getting a subprime mortgage and
for APR conditional on getting a subprime or prime mortgage. These estimates
are used to predict expected APR for minority and non-minority borrowers,
controlling for observable differences in borrower and loan characteristics.
Differences in mean mortgage outcomes between minority and non-minority
borrowers explained by the analysis are unassociated with discrimination. The
residual unexplained differences in APR, therefore, provide an upper bound for
the extent that possible differential treatment explains the higher prices paid by
minority mortgage borrowers.
An endogenous switching regression framework is used to account for the
likelihood that unobserved factors affecting whether borrowers obtain a subprime
or prime mortgage also affect the APRs borrowers receive in each market (such
factors might include, for example, borrowers’ ﬁnancial literacy or propensity to
shop for credit, and market segmentation or ‘‘steering’’ on the part of lenders).
Speciﬁcally, the endogenous switching regression framework appropriately
accounts for the possibility that the error term in the subprime/prime market
choice equation is correlated with the error terms in the subprime and prime APR
equations.22
More concretely, borrowers’ tendency to get subprime mortgages is assumed to
be characterized by an underlying response variable, y*, and that the following
regression relationship describes this underlying response:
y*  MODEL  u, (1) 1
where MODEL1 is an unspeciﬁed function and u is an N(0,1) distributed error.23
In practice, y* is not observed; we observe only whether borrowers take out
mortgages in the prime or subprime market. This process is modeled through the
use of an indicator variable, y, having the characteristic that y  1 (borrowers
take out a subprime loan) when y*  0, and y  0 (borrowers take out a prime408  Courchane
loan) when y*  0. The probability of borrowers taking out subprime or prime
mortgages can therefore be stated, respectively, as follows:
P(subprime)  P(y  1)  P(y*  0)  P(u  MODEL ) 1
 1  (MODEL ), 1 (2)
P(prime)  P(y  0)  P(y*  0)  P(u  MODEL ) 1
 (MODEL ), (3) 1
where (MODEL1) is the standard normal cumulative density function evaluated
at MODEL1.
It is further assumed that there are separate underlying functions for the
determination of APR in the subprime and prime markets, and that the regression
relationships for these underlying functions, APR2 and APR3 respectively, are given
by the following equations:
APR  MODEL   , (4) 22 2
APR  MODEL   , (5) 33 3
where MODEL2 and MODEL3 are unspeciﬁed functions, and 2 and 3 are N(0,
) and N(0, ) distributed errors, respectively. 22  23
In practice, APR2 is only observed for borrowers taking out subprime mortgages
and APR3 for borrowers taking out prime mortgages. As noted above, the error
term in the subprime/prime market determination equation we assume to be
correlated with the error terms in the APR equations, and deﬁne 2u and 3u as
the respective covariances of 2 and 3 with u. As a consequence of these
correlations, the expected values of APR for borrowers in the subprime and prime
markets are deﬁned, respectively, as follows:
E(APR u  MODEL )  MODEL  E( u  MODEL ) 21 2 21
(MODEL ) 1  MODEL   , 22 u 1  (MODEL ) 1
(6)
andThe Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  409
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E(APR u  MODEL )  MODEL  E( u  MODEL ) 31 3 31
(MODEL ) 1  MODEL   , 33 u (MODEL ) 1
(7)
where (MODEL1) is the Standard Normal density function evaluated at
MODEL1.
Note that the assumed correlation of the errors in Equations (4) and (5) with the
error in Equation (1) adds the familiar inverse Mills ratio terms to the expected
APR functions of Equations (6) and (7). Recall further that, by assumption, u 
1, so the covariances 2u and 3u can be decomposed into 22u and 33u,
respectively, where 2u and 3u are the respective correlation coefﬁcients. The
impacts of the inverse Mills ratio terms, therefore, depend directly on the extent
of the correlation in the errors. At the extreme, if the errors are uncorrelated (i.e.,
if 2u  3u  0), Equations (6) and (7) reduce to MODEL2 and MODEL3,
respectively, and the subprime and prime APR equations can appropriately be
estimated independently of the market determination equation.
Finally, borrowers’ expected unconditional APR can be written as a weighted
average of borrowers’ expected conditional APRs in the prime and subprime
markets, as follows:
E(APR)  E(APR u  MODEL )P(subprime) 21
 E(APR u  MODEL )P(prime) 31
(MODEL ) 1  MODEL    22 u 1  (MODEL ) 1
(1  (MODEL )) 1
(MODEL ) 1  MODEL   (MODEL ).  33 u 1 (MODEL ) 1
(8)
Estimating this system requires specifying the functional relationships of the three
models. There are four key issues affecting determination of these speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst is the fact that there is in each part of the APR determination process
the potential for differential treatment, although it cannot directly be observed if
any differential treatment occurs. The strategy, therefore, is to model each outcome
as a function of observable characteristics in a manner that allows for the410  Courchane
possibility of differential treatment. It is assumed that any differential treatment
toward minority borrowers can appropriately be captured solely by dummy
variables identifying borrower race/ethnicity in an estimation over all borrowers.
Ross and Yinger (2002), among others, have argued that differential treatment can
manifest itself in relatively complex interactions with race/ethnicity. Appropriately
accounting for this possibility suggests that estimations assessing differential
treatment should be more generally structured so as to allow all coefﬁcients to
vary over borrower race/ethnicity, not just the constant term. However, the
qualitative results are unchanged by this more general speciﬁcation, so for ease
of exposition, the more simpliﬁed approach is presented.24
The second modeling issue is that the explanatory variables included in the true
outcome models are unknown. This presents a particular challenge because it is
also reasonable to assume that many, if not most, explanatory variables typically
considered to be members of the true mortgage outcome models are correlated
with race/ethnicity, which creates an unusually explicit tension between over-
excluding and over-including variables in the speciﬁcations of the models being
estimated. For example, omitting variables that are part of the true model could
increase the size of the estimated parameters on the race/ethnicity dummies (if
the omitted variables are correlated with race/ethnicity), and so overstate the
potential for differential treatment. On the other hand, including variables not part
of the true model could reduce the size of the race/ethnicity dummy variables (if
the included variables are correlated with race/ethnicity), and so understate the
potential for differential treatment. The qualitative results turn out to be relatively
insensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of variables likely subject to the concerns
above.25 As a consequence, this paper presents only a single model that is
relatively inclusive in its choice of explanatory variables.
The third modeling issue concerns system identiﬁcation. Identiﬁcation of the
switching regression system is assured by the non-linearity introduced by the
standard normal function in the market determination probabilities. Identiﬁcation
is enhanced, however, by also including variables in MODEL1 that are excluded
in both MODEL2 and MODEL3.26
The fourth concern is the potential bias in the estimated coefﬁcients caused by
the likely endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, rather
than the explanatory variables ‘‘causing’’ APR as the relationship is modeled here,
APR may determine the explanatory variables. As has been noted by Barth,
Cordes, and Yezer (1980) and then explored more deeply in Yezer, Phillips, and
Trost (1994), unless explicitly accounted for, the presence of this sort of
endogeneity will bias parameter estimates. The robustness tests suggest, however,
that any such bias has relatively little practical impact on the conclusions.27
Consistent with the above discussion, models are speciﬁed for each of the i  1,
2, 3 regression relationships and the j  AA, H, WNH race/ethnicity subgroups
as follows:The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  411
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MODEL    X	  Z
 , (9) 1j 1jj 1 j 1
MODEL    X	 , (10) 2j 2jj 2
MODEL    X	 , (11) 3j 3jj 3
where ij is a constant term for ith regression relationship and jth race/ethnicity
subgroup, 	i is a parameter vector in the ith regression relationship (identical across
the j race/ethnicity subgroups) for variables common across all three regression
relationships, 
1 is a parameter vector for variables unique to MODEL1 (identical
across the j race/ethnicity subgroups), Xj is a matrix of explanatory variables
common across all models with observations restricted to the jth race/ethnicity
subgroup, and Zj is a matrix of explanatory variables unique to MODEL1 with
observations restricted to the jth race/ethnicity subgroup.
The endogenous switching regression system is estimated using the full
information maximum likelihood procedure incorporated into the ‘‘movestay’’
command of Stata.28 Robust standard errors are calculated to account for possible
heteroscedasticity in the error terms.
The next step after obtaining the switching regression estimates is to assess
differences in mortgage outcomes across borrower race/ethnicity while controlling
for observable differences across borrowers. The approach to this process is to
use the estimation results to predict average outcomes for African American and
Hispanic borrowers, and to separately compare these predicted outcomes to those
of (hypothetical) White non-Hispanic borrowers who have identical observable
characteristics as the African American and Hispanic borrowers.29
Noting that White non-Hispanic is the omitted borrower race/ethnicity category,
and therefore that 1WNH  2WNH  3WNH  0, the regression relationships
for White, non-Hispanic borrowers with African American and Hispanic
characteristics (j  AA, H) can be speciﬁed as follows:
MODEL  X	  Z
 , (12) 1WNHX, Z j 1 j 1 jj
MODEL  X	 , (13) 2WNHXj 2 j
MODEL  X	 . (14) 3WNHXj 3 j
Comparing expected APRs of minority and non-minority borrowers in the
subprime and prime markets, therefore, reduces to a comparison of the race/
ethnicity dummy variable coefﬁcients, plus differences in the inverse Mills ratio
terms of Equations (6) and (7). For example, when comparing expected subprime
APRs of African American and Hispanic borrowers to those of White non-412  Courchane
Hispanic borrowers with identical characteristics, MODEL2AA  MODEL2WNHXAA
and MODEL2H  reduce, respectively, to 2AA and 2H. Moreover, MODEL2WNHXH
the differences in the nonlinear inverse Mills ratio components of each of these
comparisons reduce to zero if observable characteristics fully explain the raw
differences in the probabilities of minority and non-minority borrowers taking out
subprime mortgages (i.e., when 1AA  1H  1WNH  0). When this is the case,
therefore, a comparison of differential APRs in the subprime and prime markets
can be conducted independently of a market determination analysis.
 Empirical Analysis
The proprietary lender data allows inclusion of an unusually complete set of
underwriting and mortgage pricing variables. Speciﬁcally, the explanatory
variables include the key underwriting factors of FICO score, LTV, and DTI. These
variables are assumed to directly affect credit risk (lower FICO scores and higher
LTVs and DTIs are assumed to be associated with higher credit risk), and therefore
affect market determination (higher credit risk is hypothesized to be associated
with a greater probability of taking out a subprime mortgage) and APR conditional
on market (higher credit risk is hypothesized to be associated with higher APRs).
Additional variables contract rate type, loan purpose, occupancy status, and
documentation type, which often are said to be secondarily associated with
mortgage underwriting decisions. The hypothesis is that adjustable rate mortgages,
reﬁnance mortgages, non-owner-occupied properties, and less than full
documentation all are associated with higher credit risk, and so result in higher
APRs and a higher probability of taking out subprime mortgages.
In addition to underwriting variables, several variables that are commonly assumed
to affect mortgage pricing are included. Both loan origination costs and default
losses, for example, are assumed to have large ﬁxed cost components, and so loan
amount is included as an explanatory variable. In addition, smaller loan amounts
are assumed to be associated with a greater probability of taking out subprime
mortgages and higher APRs. On the other hand, prepayment penalties, shorter
loan terms, and retail (as opposed to wholesale) originations are assumed to be
associated with lower costs and therefore lower APRs.
Several other factors that measure local market dynamics are also included. A
Herﬁndahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) is constructed using tract-level HMDA data
to measure the extent of market competition in the neighborhoods in which
borrowers’ properties are located.30 Greater competition (lower HHI values) is
expected to be associated with lower APRs.31 A tract-level denial percentage is
also calculated from the HMDA data. The expectation is that the costs of
origination are higher in neighborhoods with higher denial percentages, and so
APRs will be higher as well. In addition, state dummy variables and monthly
calendar dummy variables are included to account for variations in state laws and
ﬂuctuations in the yield curve that could affect market dynamics and/or pricing.The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  413
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Several variables are also included in the market determination model that are
excluded from the APR models in an effort to aid identiﬁcation.32 Speciﬁcally, it
is assumed that the more ﬁnancially knowledgeable are the borrowers, the less
likely are they to take out a subprime mortgage, all things equal. Financial
knowledge/literacy is measured using two proxy variables, both of which are
created from the 2000 census and measured at the tract level. The ﬁrst is the
population distribution of educational attainment (percentage of population with
less than a high school degree, percentage completed high school, percentage
attended some college, percentage completed college) and the second is the
percentage of owner-occupied households in the tract. Borrowers are assumed to
interact with and seek advice from their neighbors, and that formal education and
mortgage market experience both are associated with greater ﬁnancial knowledge
and literacy. As a result, it is hypothesized that the higher the tract population
educational attainment and the greater the percentage of homeowners in the tract,
the lower the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage.
The percentage of the previous years’ originations in each tract that are subprime
mortgages is also included as an additional measure of mortgage market dynamics
in the market determination model. The hypothesis is that subprime lenders tend
to market by neighborhood characteristics that remain relatively constant year-to-
year, and that borrowers tend to follow the example and advice of their neighbors
(roughly consistent with the ﬁnancial knowledge argument above). As a result,
there is expected to be a persistence to subprime lending by neighborhood, so an
increase in the tract percentage of subprime originations in the previous year is
hypothesized to increase borrowers’ probability taking out subprime mortgages.
As noted previously, the data are restricted to borrowers in three mutually
exclusive race/ethnicity categories—African American non-Hispanic borrowers
(African American), White Hispanic borrowers (Hispanic), and White non-
Hispanic borrowers. In addition, four borrower gender categories—male only,
female only, joint male and female, and unknown gender—are also included.
Continuous variables are included in the analysis in one of three forms, based on
relatively simplistic semi-parametric explorations of their relationships to the
dependent variables. First, LTV and DTI are transformed into categorical variables,
reﬂecting their highly modal distributions and inconsistently monotonic
relationships. LTV is divided into seven mutually exclusive categories: less than
or equal to 70%, greater than 70% and up to 80%, greater than 80% and up to
85%, greater than 85% and up to 90%, greater than 90% and up to 95%, greater
than 95% and up to 100%, and greater than 100%, while DTI is divided into ﬁve
mutually exclusive categories: less than or equal to 28%, greater than 28% and
up to 36%, greater than 36% and up to 50%, greater than 50%, and unknown.
Second, FICO score and loan amount are entered as linear spline functions,
reﬂecting their largely monotonic but nonlinear relationship with the dependent
variables. In particular, FICO score is treated as a continuous spline with knot
points at 600 and 700, while loan amount has both knot points and intercept
adjustments at $100,000, the conforming loan limit, and $500,000. Third, the
remaining continuous variables are entered as simple linear functions.414  Courchane
Descriptive statistics for the categorical and splined independent variables are
presented in Exhibit 3 for 2004 and Exhibit 4 for 2005.33 Distributions across
variable categories are provided for all mortgages combined, and separately for
subprime and prime mortgages. In an effort to illustrate the simple bivariate
relationships between the dependent and independent variables, for all mortgages
the percentage of subprime mortgages is added for each category, and for subprime
and prime mortgages, the mean APR is provided. Exhibit 3 shows, for example,
that in 2004, 8.16% of all loans were made to African American borrowers, and
that 43.60% of African American borrowers take out subprime loans. As a
consequence, therefore, 17.06% of subprime loans are made to African American
borrowers, at mean APRs of 8.48%, while only 5.82% of prime loans are made
to African American borrowers, at mean APRs of 6.25%.
The bivariate relationships in Exhibits 3 and 4 are generally as hypothesized. As
noted earlier, for example, minority borrowers are clearly more likely to obtain a
subprime mortgage and to have higher APRs in both the subprime and prime
markets. In addition, FICO score is strongly related to the probability of taking
out a subprime mortgage. In 2004, for example, 74.87% of borrowers with FICO
scores below 600 took out subprime mortgages, while only 6.33% of borrowers
with FICO scores above 700 did so. The bivariate relationships with LTV and
DTI are less monotonic. Generally higher LTV and higher DTI are associated with
higher APR, but not consistently, and both LTV and DTI appear to have complex
relationships with the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage. The most
obvious exceptions to the hypothesized relationships occur for occupancy status,
which shows lower APR for non-owner-occupants, and documentation status and
prepayment penalty, which sometimes show full-documentation mortgages and
mortgages with prepayment penalties having higher APRs.
Descriptive statistics for the remaining variables are shown in Exhibit 5 for 2004
and Exhibit 6 for 2005. Here the mean value of each variable is shown separately
for subprime and prime mortgages, and the correlation with APR is provided only
for the variables included in the APR models. As hypothesized, there is a positive
correlation with APR for both HHI and mortgage denial percentage. In addition,
subprime borrowers are more likely to live in tracts with populations that have a
lower educational attainment, fewer owner-occupants, and a higher percentage of
subprime originations in the previous year.
Exhibits 7 and 8 look more closely at the distributions of FICO scores for 2004
and 2005, respectively. Panel A of each exhibit shows the FICO score distributions
by borrower race/ethnicity for the subprime market, and Panel B shows equivalent
distributions for the prime market. The exhibits clearly show that within each
market, White non-Hispanic borrowers tend to have higher FICO scores than
Hispanic borrowers, who in turn tend to have higher FICO scores than African
American borrowers. This echoes the relationship in mean APRs across the three
borrower groups, suggesting that differences in FICO scores likely are an
important factor in explaining APR differentials. Exhibits 8 and 9 also show that






















































Exhibit 3  2004 Discrete Variable Descriptive Statistics







Race/Ethnicity African American 8.16 43.60 17.06 8.48 5.82 6.25
Hispanic 9.23 33.26 14.72 7.86 7.78 5.94
White non-Hispanic 82.61 17.22 68.21 7.83 86.40 5.65
FICO Score 500  FICO  600 7.98 74.87 28.66 8.80 2.53 7.76
600  FICO  700 34.45 32.53 53.74 7.88 29.37 5.94
700  FICO  800 56.94 6.33 17.29 6.76 67.39 5.53
Loan-to-Value LTV  70% 32.72 11.42 17.92 7.61 36.63 5.51
70%  LTV  80% 43.03 16.62 34.30 7.68 45.33 5.53
80%  LTV  85% 3.91 56.24 10.55 8.22 2.16 6.19
85%  LTV  90% 8.63 42.55 17.62 8.20 6.27 6.48
90%  LTV  95% 5.77 31.22 8.63 8.22 5.01 6.35
95%  LTV  100% 5.73 38.33 10.53 8.44 4.46 7.11
100%  LTV 0.21 45.17 0.45 8.86 0.14 6.68
Debt-to-Income DTI  28% 22.95 12.34 13.58 7.87 25.42 5.58
28%  DTI  36% 25.00 15.10 18.10 7.92 26.82 5.63
36%  DTI  50% 40.35 28.55 55.25 8.04 36.42 5.76
50%  DTI 8.98 22.61 9.74 7.76 8.78 5.95
Unknown DTI 2.73 25.53 3.34 7.42 2.57 6.22
Loan Amount Loan Amount  $100,000 28.20 23.39 31.64 8.62 27.30 6.12
$100,000  Loan Amount  $334,000 62.45 20.28 60.74 7.70 62.90 5.63
$334,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 5.74 23.36 6.42 7.23 5.55 5.14
$500,000  Loan Amount 3.61 6.88 1.19 6.65 4.25 4.91
Contract Rate Type Fixed 49.28 10.92 25.81 7.40 55.46 5.92
Adjustable 37.46 37.04 66.55 8.17 29.80 5.06













Exhibit 3  (continued)
2004 Discrete Variable Descriptive Statistics







Loan Purpose Purchase Money 42.61 16.18 33.06 7.89 45.13 5.78
Reﬁnance 57.39 24.32 66.94 7.97 54.87 5.65
Occupancy Status Owner-Occupied 88.18 21.35 90.27 7.94 87.63 5.67
Not Owner-Occupied 11.82 17.17 9.73 8.01 12.37 5.94
Documentation Type Full Documentation 39.14 26.90 50.50 8.07 36.15 5.74
Not Full Documentation 42.60 11.44 23.37 7.88 47.67 5.51
Unknown Documentation Type 18.25 29.84 26.12 7.77 16.18 6.20
Prepayment Penalty No Prepayment Penalty 73.36 5.74 20.20 7.75 87.36 5.63
Prepayment Penalty 9.87 85.06 40.28 8.40 1.86 6.10
Unknown Prepayment Penalty 16.77 49.15 39.51 7.59 10.77 6.28
Loan Term Loan Term  5 years 0.54 25.78 0.67 8.17 0.51 5.50
5 years  Loan Term  15 years 16.99 11.20 9.13 8.42 19.06 5.54
15 years  Loan Term  20 years 3.24 19.85 3.08 8.32 3.28 5.95
20 years  Loan Term  30 years 79.23 22.93 87.11 7.88 77.15 5.74
30 years  Loan Term  40 years 0.01 53.76 0.01 10.77 0.00 5.84
Channel Wholesale 29.96 42.76 61.43 7.92 21.66 5.89
Retail 70.04 11.48 38.57 7.99 78.34 5.66
Gender Male 27.69 25.59 33.98 7.96 26.03 5.81
Female 21.60 26.18 27.12 8.07 20.15 5.86
Joint Male/Female 50.60 15.89 38.56 7.85 53.77 5.60
Unknown Gender 0.12 60.95 0.34 8.06 0.06 6.20
Notes: The number of loans (weighted) for all loans  794,204; the number of loans (weighted) for subprime loans  165,610; and the number of loans






















































Exhibit 4  2005 Discrete Variable Descriptive Statistics







Race/Ethnicity African American 9.32 44.54 19.68 9.57 6.55 6.72
Hispanic 11.81 34.73 19.45 9.24 9.77 6.50
White non-Hispanic 78.87 16.28 60.88 9.07 83.68 6.25
FICO Score 500  FICO  600 9.17 73.86 32.12 9.99 3.04 7.88
600  FICO  700 37.40 31.27 55.43 8.98 32.58 6.47
700  FICO  800 52.70 4.86 12.15 8.17 63.55 6.14
Loan-to-Value LTV  70% 25.54 10.43 12.63 8.95 29.00 6.06
70%  LTV  80% 44.95 21.11 44.99 9.11 44.95 6.19
80%  LTV  85% 4.04 54.37 10.40 9.22 2.33 6.50
85%  LTV  90% 10.82 34.30 17.59 9.58 9.01 6.75
90%  LTV  95% 5.61 17.76 4.72 9.30 5.85 6.65
95%  LTV  100% 8.90 22.69 9.57 9.24 8.72 6.95
100%  LTV 0.13 13.96 0.09 7.90 0.15 6.82
Debt-to-Income DTI  28% 17.72 12.66 10.63 9.16 19.62 6.25
28%  DTI  36% 20.13 16.53 15.77 9.17 21.29 6.28
36%  DTI  50% 45.06 30.84 65.87 9.21 39.49 6.33
50%  DTI 13.07 10.98 6.80 9.52 14.75 6.33
Unknown DTI 4.03 4.85 0.93 7.65 4.86 6.39
Loan Amount Loan Amount  $100,000 21.86 23.63 24.49 9.57 21.16 6.56
$100,000  Loan Amount  $360,000 67.21 20.86 66.46 9.10 67.41 6.25
$360,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 6.11 22.58 6.54 8.91 5.99 6.27
$500,000  Loan Amount 4.82 11.01 2.51 9.07 5.44 6.12
Contract Rate Type Fixed 24.67 17.84 20.86 7.76 25.69 6.09
Adjustable 22.14 65.47 68.72 9.71 9.69 6.41













Exhibit 4  (continued)
2005 Discrete Variable Descriptive Statistics







Loan Purpose Purchase Money 47.53 17.32 39.02 9.40 49.80 6.39
Reﬁnance 52.47 24.52 60.98 9.08 50.20 6.22
Occupancy Status Owner-Occupied 86.75 22.16 91.10 9.16 85.58 6.28
Not Owner-Occupied 13.25 14.16 8.90 9.61 14.42 6.47
Documentation Type Full Documentation 30.38 39.88 57.44 9.21 23.15 6.20
Not Full Documentation 22.60 33.37 35.75 9.37 19.09 6.35
Unknown Documentation Type 47.02 3.06 6.81 8.25 57.77 6.33
Prepayment Penalty No Prepayment Penalty 51.25 9.48 23.02 9.53 58.80 6.17
Prepayment Penalty 16.27 91.00 70.17 9.19 1.86 5.92
Unknown Prepayment Penalty 32.48 4.42 6.81 8.25 39.34 6.52
Loan Term Loan Term  5 years 3.85 6.84 1.25 7.45 4.54 6.24
5 years  Loan Term  15 years 8.80 3.60 1.50 7.91 10.75 6.03
15 years  Loan Term  20 years 2.72 5.61 0.72 7.92 3.25 6.32
20 years  Loan Term  30 years 83.58 23.46 92.95 9.22 81.07 6.34
30 years  Loan Term  40 years 1.06 71.09 3.58 10.19 0.39 6.59
Channel Wholesale 52.23 36.48 90.31 9.32 42.05 6.31
Retail 47.77 4.28 9.69 8.09 57.95 6.31
Gender Male 32.75 25.83 40.10 9.29 30.78 6.44
Female 23.39 26.54 29.42 9.35 21.77 6.41
Joint Male/Female 43.73 14.65 30.37 8.94 47.30 6.17
Unknown Gender 0.14 16.06 0.11 9.46 0.15 6.26
Notes: The number of loans (weighted) for all loans  367,714; the number of loans (weighted) for subprime loans  77,575; and the number of loans
(weighted) for prime loans  290,139.The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  419
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416.16 299.31 0.08 489.58 388.00 0.04
Tract Mortgage Denial Percent 26.99 9.03 0.32 22.58 8.31 0.35
Tract Percentage Less than
High School
19.49 12.63 — 14.31 10.62 —
Tract Percentage Completed
High School
29.13 8.95 — 25.81 9.90 —
Tract Percentage Some
College
29.36 7.25 — 29.69 6.95 —
Tract Percentage Completed
College
22.01 14.15 — 30.19 17.41 —
Tract Percentage Owner-
Occupied
65.83 18.56 — 67.74 19.01 —
Tract Percentage Subprime
Originations in Previous Year
13.74 9.13 — 9.08 6.65 —
Notes: The number of loans (weighted) for subprime loans  165,610; and the number of loans
(weighted) for prime loans  628,594.
that there is a fairly substantial overlap in these distributions. This suggests that
FICO scores likely are important factors in explaining market determination, but
that they likely are not the only factor.
The estimation results from the endogenous switching regression models are
provided in Exhibit 9 for 2004 and Exhibit 10 for 2005. The majority of the
estimated coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant with p-values less than 0.0001.
Moreover, the data strongly reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity, implying
that a switching regression framework is appropriate for this analysis. In particular,
the estimated error correlation coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant in both
years.34
The positive sign of the correlation coefﬁcient for the 2004 subprime APR
equation implies that borrowers taking out subprime mortgages pay higher APRs
in the subprime market than would random borrowers from a pool of both prime
and subprime borrowers. Equivalently, the negative correlation coefﬁcients
estimated in the prime equations for both years imply that borrowers taking out
prime mortgages pay higher APRs in the prime market than would random
borrowers. In other words, some borrowers that could do better in the prime420  Courchane












358.67 243.86 0.00 422.26 307.21 0.06
Tract Mortgage Denial
Percent
28.81 8.87 0.15 25.23 8.54 0.21
Tract Percentage Less than
High School
20.59 12.78 — 16.19 11.39 —
Tract Percentage Completed
High School
29.77 8.58 — 26.87 9.98 —
Tract Percentage Some
College
28.77 7.19 — 29.72 7.15 —
Tract Percentage Completed
College
20.88 13.55 — 27.23 16.54 —
Tract Percentage Owner-
Occupied




26.63 12.44 — 21.30 11.22 —
Notes: The number of loans (weighted) for subprime loans  77,431; and the number of loans
(weighted) for prime loans  289,874.
market nonetheless take out a subprime mortgage, and some borrowers that could
do better in the subprime market nonetheless take out a prime mortgage. A
possible partial explanation for this apparently poor borrower matching in the
subprime market is this market’s generally faster approval rates.35 This result is
also consistent with the possibility that there are omitted variables in the market
determination and subprime APR models that are correlated with credit risk and
known to lenders, which leads to higher-risk borrowers getting a subprime
mortgage at a higher APR. This latter explanation, however, does not well ﬁt the
prime market results.36 More broadly, these relationships appear consistent with
unobserved market segmentation or steering on the part of lenders in an effort to
maximize revenues, although there is no way to verify this from the data.
Interestingly, the subprime coefﬁcient switches sign in 2005, albeit with a very
small absolute value.
The generally small absolute value of the correlation coefﬁcients suggests that
endogeneity plays a relatively minor part in determining borrowers’ expected
APRs. On average, for example, the inverse Mills ratio terms shift expected APRsThe Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  421
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Exhibit 7  2004 FICO Score Distributions
Panel A: FICO score distributions by borrower race/ethnicity for the subprime market
Panel B: FICO score distributions by borrower race/ethnicity for the prime market422  Courchane
Exhibit 8  2005 FICO Score Distributions
Panel A: FICO score distributions by borrower race/ethnicity for the subprime market






















































Exhibit 9  2004 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Intercept 3.06 0.0001 22.21 0.0001 28.06 0.0001
Race/Ethnicity African American 0.09 0.0001 0.10 0.0001 0.08 0.0001
Hispanic 0.03 0.0130 0.13 0.0001 0.04 0.0001
White non-Hispanic 0 — 0 — 0 —
FICO Score Splines 500  FICO  600 0.52 0.0001 1.44 0.0001 3.45 0.0001
(100s) 600  FICO  700 1.03 0.0001 1.01 0.0001 0.54 0.0001
700  FICO  800 0.36 0.0001 0.72 0.0001 0.01 0.0180
Loan-to-Value LTV  70% 1.10 0.0001 1.77 0.0001 0.65 0.0001
70%  LTV  80% 0.89 0.0001 1.63 0.0001 0.60 0.0001
80%  LTV  85% 0.46 0.0001 1.41 0.0001 0.32 0.0001
85%  LTV  90% 0.64 0.0001 1.21 0.0001 0.01 0.9330
90%  LTV  95% 0.68 0.0001 0.86 0.0001 0.02 0.8000
95%  LTV  100% 0.88 0.0001 0.33 0.0001 0.43 0.0001
100%  LTV 0 — 0 — 0 —
Debt-to-Income DTI  28% 0 — 0 — 0 —
28%  DTI  36% 0.06 0.0001 0.06 0.0001 0.01 0.0001
36%  DTI  50% 0.22 0.0001 0.15 0.0001 0.03 0.0001
50%  DTI 0.02 0.1950 0.04 0.0001 0.04 0.0001
Unknown DTI 0.59 0.0001 0.16 0.0001 0.28 0.0001
Loan Amount Splines Loan Amount  $100,000 3.06 0.0001 19.73 0.0001 8.92 0.0001
($1,000,000s) $100,000  Loan Amount  $334,000 0.07 0.2910 2.94 0.0001 1.04 0.0001
$334,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 1.40 0.0001 0.23 0.1120 0.02 0.9190













Exhibit 9  (continued)
2004 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Loan Amount Loan Amount  $100,000 0 — 0 — 0 —
Indicator $100,000  Loan Amount  $334,000 0.15 0.0001 0.04 0.0001 0.06 0.0001
$334,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 0.02 0.5170 0.20 0.0001 0.15 0.0001
$500,000  Loan Amount 0.00 0.9700 0.13 0.0010 0.13 0.0001
Contract Rate Type Fixed 0 — 0 — 0 —
Adjustable 0.78 0.0001 0.37 0.0001 0.96 0.0001
Unknown Contract Rate Type 2.02 0.0001 0.29 0.0001 0.24 0.0001
Loan Purpose Purchase Money 0 — 0 — 0 —
Reﬁnance 0.34 0.0001 0.03 0.0001 0.05 0.0001
Occupancy Status Owner-Occupied 0 — 0 — 0 —
Not Owner-Occupied 0.05 0.0001 0.22 0.0001 0.27 0.0001
Documentation Type Full Documentation 0 — 0 — 0 —
Not Full Documentation 0.11 0.0001 0.16 0.0001 0.07 0.0001
Unknown Documentation Type 0.75 0.0001 0.32 0.0001 0.13 0.0001
Prepayment Penalty No Prepayment Penalty 0 — 0 — 0 —
Prepayment Penalty 2.78 0.0001 0.42 0.0001 0.01 0.4490
Unknown Prepayment Penalty 2.10 0.0001 0.68 0.0001 0.08 0.0001
Loan Term Loan Term  5 years 0.74 0.0001 1.78 0.0001 0.05 0.8240
5 years  Loan Term  15 years 1.29 0.0001 2.25 0.0001 0.26 0.2810
15 years  Loan Term  20 years 1.02 0.0001 2.45 0.0001 0.16 0.4960
20 years  Loan Term  30 years 1.16 0.0001 2.72 0.0001 0.26 0.2720






















































Exhibit 9  (continued)
2004 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Channel Wholesale 0.90 0.0001 0.08 0.0001 0.04 0.0001
Retail 0 — 0 — 0 —
Gender Male 0 — 0 — 0 —
Female 0.02 0.0090 0.01 0.0150 0.00 0.7300
Joint Male/Female 0.08 0.0001 0.04 0.0001 0.03 0.0001
Unknown Gender 1.54 0.0001 0.16 0.0001 0.07 0.4610
Tract HHI (10,000s) 1.75 0.0001 0.12 0.1780 0.11 0.0350
Tract Mortgage Denial Percentage (100s) 0.66 0.0001 0.64 0.0001 0.63 0.0001
Tract-Level Education Percentage Less than High School 0 — — — — —
Percentage Completed High School 0.03 0.7410 — — — —
Percentage Some College 0.15 0.0060 — — — —
Percentage Completed College 0.40 0.0001 — — — —
Tract Percentage Owner-Occupied (100s) 14.39 0.0001 — — — —
Tract Percentage Subprime Originations in Previous Year (100s) 0.65 0.0001 — — — —
State Control Dummies yes yes yes
Calendar Month Control Dummies yes yes yes
Standard Error of Residual — — 0.97 0.0001 0.59 0.0001
Correlation Coefﬁcient — — 0.03 0.0001 0.11 0.0001













Exhibit 10  2005 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Intercept 1.47 0.0001 16.88 0.0001 21.33 0.0001
Race/Ethnicity African American 0.09 0.0001 0.03 0.0001 0.12 0.0001
Hispanic 0.04 0.1210 0.07 0.0001 0.12 0.0001
White non-Hispanic 0 — 0 — 0 —
FICO Score Splines 500  FICO  600 0.27 0.0001 1.44 0.0001 2.33 0.0001
(100s) 600  FICO  700 1.20 0.0001 0.81 0.0001 0.49 0.0001
700  FICO  800 0.33 0.0001 0.36 0.0001 0.08 0.0001
Loan-to-Value LTV  70% 1.21 0.0001 0.35 0.0030 0.61 0.0001
70%  LTV  80% 1.03 0.0001 0.48 0.0001 0.51 0.0001
80%  LTV  85% 0.43 0.0001 0.49 0.0001 0.22 0.0090
85%  LTV  90% 0.71 0.0001 0.87 0.0001 0.02 0.7930
90%  LTV  95% 0.78 0.0001 1.06 0.0001 0.02 0.7920
95%  LTV  100% 0.93 0.0001 1.33 0.0001 0.19 0.0220
100%  LTV 0 — 0 — 0 —
Debt-to-Income DTI  28% 0 — 0 — 0 —
28%  DTI  36% 0.06 0.0070 0.03 0.0060 0.01 0.1920
36%  DTI  50% 0.17 0.0001 0.02 0.0300 0.00 0.8450
50%  DTI 0.23 0.0001 0.04 0.0020 0.01 0.2610
Unknown DTI 0.17 0.0190 0.28 0.0020 0.05 0.0010
Loan Amount Splines Loan Amount  $100,000 9.69 0.0001 13.55 0.0001 9.24 0.0001
($1,000,000s) $100,000  Loan Amount  $334,000 1.35 0.0001 1.73 0.0001 0.65 0.0001
$334,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 0.01 0.9930 0.10 0.6660 0.01 0.9770






















































Exhibit 10  (continued)
2005 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Loan Amount Loan Amount  $100,000 0 — 0 — 0 
Indicator $100,000  Loan Amount  $334,000 0.13 0.0001 0.07 0.0001 0.09 0.0001
$334,000  Loan Amount  $500,000 0.45 0.0001 0.01 0.7500 0.23 0.0001
$500,000  Loan Amount 0.49 0.0010 0.07 0.0850 0.16 0.0020
Contract Rate Type Fixed 0 — 0 — 0 —
Adjustable 0.69 0.0001 1.71 0.0001 0.35 0.0001
Unknown Contract Rate Type 1.03 0.0001 1.63 0.0001 0.13 0.0001
Loan Purpose Purchase Money 0 — 0 — 0 —
Reﬁnance 0.38 0.0001 0.15 0.0001 0.00 0.5820
Occupancy Status Owner-Occupied 0 — 0 — 0 —
Not Owner-Occupied 0.10 0.0001 0.53 0.0001 0.22 0.0001
Documentation Type Full Documentation 0 — 0 — 0 —
Not Full Documentation 0.32 0.0001 0.41 0.0001 0.23 0.0001
Unknown Documentation Type 1.18 0.0001 0.81 0.0001 0.08 0.0001
Prepayment Penalty No Prepayment Penalty 0 — 0 — 0 —
Prepayment Penalty 3.04 0.0001 0.16 0.0001 0.01 0.3090
Unknown Prepayment Penalty 1.45 0.0001 0 — 0.35 0.0001
Loan Term Loan Term  5 years 0.82 0.0001 1.21 0.0001 0.43 0.0001
5 years  Loan Term  15 years 0.33 0.0001 0.59 0.0001 0.40 0.0001
15 years  Loan Term  20 years 0.18 0.0020 0.48 0.0001 0.08 0.0010
20 years  Loan Term  30 years 0.23 0.0001 0.27 0.0001 0.16 0.0001
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2005 Endogenous Switching Regression Estimates







Channel Wholesale 1.24 0.0001 0.31 0.0001 0.23 0.0001
Retail 0 — 0 — 0 —
Gender Male 0 — 0 — 0 —
Female 0.02 0.2590 0.02 0.0090 0.02 0.0250
Joint Male/Female 0.03 0.0450 0.03 0.0001 0.08 0.0001
Unknown Gender 0.15 0.2160 0.18 0.0150 0.01 0.8110
Tract HHI (10,000s) 1.01 0.0001 0.93 0.0001 0.18 0.0750
Tract Mortgage Denial Percentage (100s) 0.55 0.0001 0.62 0.0001 0.26 0.0001
Tract-Level Education Percentage Less than High School 0 —
Percentage Completed High School 0.97 0.0001
Percentage Some College 0.54 0.0001
Percentage Completed College 0.97 0.0001
Tract Percentage Owner-Occupied (100s) 2.76 0.5310
Tract Percentage Subprime Originations in Previous Year (100s) 0.94 0.0001
State Control Dummies yes yes yes
Calendar Month Control Dummies yes yes yes
Standard Error of Residual 0.82 0.0001 0.64 0.0001
Correlation Coefﬁcient 0.09 0.0001 0.13 0.0001
Notes: The number of observation is 367,714. The Wald Chi-Squared Test of Independent Equations with 2 df (p-value) is 222.23 (0.0001).The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  429
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only by about one basis point. Endogeneity can, however, have larger impacts for
some borrowers. In 2004, for example, endogeniety increases expected APRs by
more than ﬁve basis points for 5% of subprime borrowers.
The race/ethnicity coefﬁcients are of greatest import in the analysis. Starting with
the market determination models, the Hispanic coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcantly
different from zero at the 5% level in either year. Observable characteristics,
therefore, fully explain the difference in the probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage between Hispanic and White non-Hispanic borrowers. As discussed
above, this implies that the endogeniety of the switching regression model will
have no impact in explaining differences in APR between Hispanic and White
non-Hispanic borrowers.
The African American coefﬁcient in the market determination model is small but
statistically signiﬁcant for both 2004 and 2005. This means that observable
characteristics cannot fully explain the differential subprime probabilities for
African American and White non-Hispanic borrowers; however, the unexplained
differences are quite small.
The African American and Hispanic coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant in APR
estimations of the subprime and prime markets in both 2004 and 2005. Because,
as noted above, the correlation coefﬁcients and the race/ethnicity dummies in the
market determination model are both small, the race/ethnicity coefﬁcients in the
APR models closely approximate differences in expected APRs. In 2005, for
example, the direct effect from the African American coefﬁcient suggests that,
holding constant other observable characteristics, African American borrowers
have APRs that are 3 basis points above White non-Hispanic subprime borrowers,
and 12 basis points above White non-Hispanic prime borrowers. This is
substantially less than the Exhibit 2 uncontrolled differentials of 50 and 47 basis
points, respectively, suggesting that observable characteristics explain much of the
difference in mortgage prices paid by African American and White non-Hispanic
borrowers.
The results for Hispanic borrowers are similar, although somewhat smaller in size.
Exhibit 2 shows uncontrolled Hispanic differentials of 17 basis points and 25 basis
points, respectively, in the subprime and prime markets in 2005. Controlling for
observable characteristics reduces these differences to 7 basis points in the
subprime market and 12 basis points in the prime market.
The remainder of this section brieﬂy discusses the other coefﬁcients in the
switching regression equations. Before doing so, however, note that the primary
use of the estimations is for prediction. The model speciﬁcations, therefore, were
not developed to capture accurately the marginal impact of each of the remaining
included explanatory variables. As a consequence, the individual coefﬁcients of
these variables should not be given undue weight.
FICO scores performed as expected—the higher the FICO score the lower the
probability of taking out a subprime mortgage. The greatest marginal impact on430  Courchane
market determination occurs in the FICO score range of 600 to 700, which is,
arguably, the FICO score boundary between subprime and prime lending. Higher
FICO scores also are associated with lower APRs, but the strength of this
relationship declines signiﬁcantly in the higher FICO scores ranges. LTV is
signiﬁcant in explaining market determination, but without a clear, monotonic
relationship. This reﬂects, the bimodal competing tendencies of equity and high-
risk lending in the subprime market. Higher LTVs are consistently and
monotonically related to higher APRs in the subprime market. That same
relationship holds for LTVs below 90% in the prime market. At greater LTVs, the
strength and consistency of the relationship declines, however, perhaps because
mortgage insurers in the prime market share credit risk for LTVs at higher levels.
DTI also is signiﬁcant in explaining the probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage, with the highest probability associated with unknown DTIs and DTIs
in the 35% to 50% range. The former likely is associated with the higher frequency
of ‘‘no income, no asset’’ loans in the subprime market. As expected, lower loan
amounts are associated with higher APRs in both the prime and subprime markets,
consistent with costs being driven by large ﬁxed origination and loss severity
components.
Occupancy status and loan term both perform as expected—non-owner-occupied
is associated with higher APRs in both the subprime and prime markets, as are
longer loan terms. Surprisingly, adjustable rate mortgages have higher APRs in
the 2004 subprime market, and in both markets in 2005, perhaps because of a
ﬂattening of the yield curve. Equally surprising is that reﬁnance mortgages have
lower APRs in all estimations except the 2004 prime market. As expected, less
than full documentation loans are associated more closely with subprime than
prime lending, and except for the 2004 prime market, also are associated with
higher APRs. Prepayment penalties are much more associated with subprime than
prime lending.37 Despite widespread evidence from rates sheets that prepayment
penalties lower contract rates, the estimations capture such an impact on APR
only for the 2005 subprime market. Likely this is due to correlation between
prepayment penalties and the other explanatory variables, and does not reﬂect a
failure to deliver rate reductions to borrowers with prepayment penalties.
Subprime lending is more highly related to the wholesale channel, and wholesale
(as opposed to retail) originations have higher APRs everywhere except the 2004
subprime market. There is no substantial difference in the mortgage outcomes of
male and female borrowers, but there is a slight tendency for joint male/female
borrowers to take out prime mortgages and to have lower APRs.
As expected, higher market concentrations (higher HHIs) are associated with
higher APRs in the 2005 subprime market, but not consistently elsewhere. Further,
higher HHIs are associated with a lower probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage, suggesting that, at least in 2004 and 2005, subprime is the least
concentrated of the two markets. Tract-level mortgage denial percentages are
statistically signiﬁcant, but inconsistently related to the probability of taking outThe Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  431
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a subprime mortgage. Denial rates, however, are strongly related to APRs in the
subprime and prime markets of both years, with higher denial rates (reﬂecting
higher origination costs) associated with higher APRs.
Tract-level education performs about as expected, with higher educational
attainment roughly associated with a reduced probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage. Tract percentage owner-occupied performs counter to expectations,
however, with higher percentage associated with higher subprime probabilities.
Finally, tract percentage of subprime originations in the previous year is associated
with a higher probability of taking out a subprime mortgage, as expected.
 Conclusion
Exhibit 11 provides a summary of the comparisons between minority and non-
minority mortgage outcomes, as derived from the endogenous switching regression
model estimates. It follows the format of Exhibit 2 but adds rows for White non-
Hispanic borrowers with minority borrower characteristics, calculated as described
above.38
Exhibit 11 clearly demonstrates that the vast majority of APR differentials
between minority and non-minority mortgage borrowers can be explained by
observable characteristics appropriately associated with underwriting and pricing
outcomes. For example, the uncontrolled difference in the 2004 mean APR of
African American and White non-Hispanic borrowers is 116 basis points.39
Controlling for observable differences between borrowers, however, reduces this
difference to only 10 basis points. For Hispanic borrowers in 2004, uncontrolled
differences of 55 basis points are reduced to 8 basis points after controls. Results
for 2005 are similar—African American borrower differentials go from 127 basis
points to 9 basis points, and Hispanic borrower differentials go from 75 basis
points to 11 basis points.
One of the primary reasons the underwriting and pricing controls so signiﬁcantly
narrow differences in mean predicted APR is the success of the control variables
in predicting the probability that borrowers will take out subprime mortgages.
Speciﬁcally, the market determination model explains nearly all of the race/
ethnicity differentials in the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage.
Minority borrowers have a dramatically greater probability of taking out a
mortgage in the higher priced subprime market—28.38 percentage points higher
for African American borrowers in 2005, for example. The control variables
in the market determination model reduce these unexplained race/ethnicity
differentials to around one percentage point or less—the unexplained probability
differential of taking out a subprime mortgage is only 0.70 percentage points for
African American borrowers in 2005, for example. Because control variables
explain over 95% of the market determination differential, any remaining
unexplained race/ethnicity differentials in APR that might be suggestive of
differential treatment must be largely associated with unexplained differentials

























2004 African American 7.18 44.08% 8.47 6.23
Hispanic 6.57 33.12% 7.85 5.93
White non-Hispanic 6.02 17.26% 7.82 5.64
White non-Hispanic with African American Characteristics 7.08 42.84% 8.38 6.16
White non-Hispanic with Hispanic Characteristics 6.49 32.79% 7.72 5.89
African American minus White non-Hispanic 1.16 26.82% 0.65 0.59
African American minus White non-Hispanic with African
American Characteristics
0.10 1.24% 0.10 0.08
Hispanic minus White non-Hispanic 0.55 15.85% 0.04 0.29
Hispanic minus White non-Hispanic with Hispanic Characteristics 0.08 0.32% 0.13 0.04
2005 African American 7.99 44.94% 9.58 6.71
Hispanic 7.46 34.92% 9.26 6.49
White non-Hispanic 6.71 16.55% 9.10 6.25
White non-Hispanic with African American Characteristics 7.89 44.23% 9.55 6.59
White non-Hispanic with Hispanic Characteristics 7.35 34.66% 9.19 6.37
African American minus White non-Hispanic 1.27 28.38% 0.49 0.47
African American minus White non-Hispanic with African
American Characteristics
0.09 0.70% 0.03 0.12
Hispanic minus White non-Hispanic 0.75 18.37% 0.16 0.25
Hispanic minus White non-Hispanic with Hispanic Characteristics 0.11 0.25% 0.07 0.12The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  433
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Conditional APR differentials are also signiﬁcantly explained by observable
characteristics appropriately associated with underwriting and pricing outcomes,
although these reductions are not as dramatic as for overall (unconditional) APR.
For example, in 2004, uncontrolled African American borrower differentials are
65 basis points in the subprime market and 59 basis points in the prime market,
and these gaps decline to 10 basis points and 8 basis points respectively after
accounting for observable characteristics. In 2005, African American borrower
gaps of 49 basis points and 47 basis points for the subprime and prime markets,
respectively, are narrowed to 3 basis points and 12 basis points, respectively, after
controls.
The trends for Hispanic borrowers generally follow those of African American
borrowers. In 2005, gaps of 16 basis points and 25 basis points for the subprime
and prime markets, respectively, are reduced to 7 basis points and 12 basis points,
respectively, after controls. The 2004 results for Hispanic borrowers show an
interesting twist. The prime market gap reduces from 29 basis points to 4 basis
points with controls. In the subprime market, however, the gap increases from a
raw value of 4 basis points to 13 basis points after controlling for underwriting
and pricing characteristics. This later outcome implies that, at least for the
subprime market in 2004, Hispanic borrowers have slightly better characteristics
(lower risk/cost) than White non-Hispanic borrowers in general.
The signiﬁcantly higher (uncontrolled) APRs paid by minority borrowers are
problematic, and need to be addressed. The empirical results suggest, however,
that relatively little of the aggregate differences in APRs paid by minority and
non-minority borrowers are attributable to the differential treatment of borrowers.
Instead, in both years, up to 90% of the African American APR gap and 85% of
the Hispanic APR gap is due to observable differences in underwriting, costing,
and market dynamic factors that appropriately explain mortgage pricing
differentials.40
Aggregate analyses like those in this study, of course, cannot assess whether there
is differential treatment of individual minority mortgage borrowers. Nor should
any such differential treatment that might occur be ignored. The analysis does
suggest, however, that public policies aimed at remediating APR differentials
would achieve a far greater return through the elimination of race/ethnicity
differentials in FICO scores, income, wealth used to lower LTV ratios, and,
arguably, ﬁnancial literacy, than they would through the elimination of any
possible differential treatment.
Finally, the analysis of mortgage pricing outcomes is unique in its use of an
endogenous switching regression framework. The data strongly reject the null
hypothesis that the estimating equations are independent, supporting the need to
explicitly address the potential endogeneity inherent in the setting of APRs. As a
practical matter, however, this approach can rarely be applied in regulatory reviews
of a single lender, since loans available for analysis will often be either entirely
subprime or entirely prime. Moreover, as noted above, the ﬁndings reveal a434  Courchane
relatively small correlation in the error terms and a small unexplained minority
borrower differential in the probability of taking out a subprime mortgage,
suggesting that explicitly accounting for endogeneity will generally have a
relatively minor impact on the assessment of APR differentials between minority
and non-minority borrowers.
 Endnotes
1 The rate spread reporting threshold is 3 percentage points above a comparable Treasury
rate for a ﬁrst lien loan and 5 percentage points above a comparable Treasury for a
second lien loan. In calculating the rate spread, the lender uses the Treasury yield for
securities of a comparable maturity as of the ﬁfteenth day of a given month. Lenders
use the ﬁfteenth day of a given month for any loan on which the interest rate was set
on or after that day through the fourteenth day of the next month. The APR used in the
calculations is the one calculated and disclosed to the consumer under section 226.18
of Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
2 See, for example, Inside Mortgage Finance, 2006, issues 42 and 43, and Consumer
Federation of America 2005 and 2006.
3 See http://www.oag.state.ny.us and select December 2006 press releases.
4 As Jack Guttentag notes, ‘‘APR is a good idea badly executed. . .’’ (http://
www.mtgprofessor.com). The value of APR as a measure of price is that it incorporates
both upfront fees and monthly payments. The disadvantage is that in so doing, APR
assumes that loans run their full term to maturity. In fact, however, most borrowers
prepay their mortgages well before they mature. This means that upfront fees tend to
be undervalued in the APR calculation. That said, APR is the best, consistently applied
measure of the all-in costs of taking out a mortgage.
5 The point is that the authors have access to data that typically are available only to
regulators conducting a second-stage analysis, not that the precise model structure or
variable speciﬁcations used by these regulators are employed. In particular, no regulators
use endogenous switching regression models, nor do they consistently rely as heavily
on market-level controls. Further, regulators do not pool data across lenders but analyze
each lender separately. Any unexplained race/ethnicity differentials in the models may
result from this pooling.
6 There is no consensus on how best to distinguish between subprime and prime—
speciﬁcally, whether the distinction should be made at the lender or the loan level. Users
of HMDA data have historically relied on lender designations provided by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The introduction of loan-level rate-
spread variables in the 2004 HMDA, however, has allowed researchers to make the
subprime versus prime designation at the loan level. Because lenders in this study self-
designate as either prime or subprime, and because lenders are believed to concentrate
on serving higher- versus lower-risk borrowers who employ substantially different
business strategies and practices, the analysis relies on lender designations to distinguish
between subprime and prime.
7 See Halvorson (1985) for an early application of switching regression models under
similar circumstances.
8 See Avery, Canner, and Cook (2005) and Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006). For a
detailed history of the evolution of HMDA, see Kolar and Jerison (2005).The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  435
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9 See Bocian, Ernst, and Li (2006).
10 See Consumer Federation of America (2005, 2006).
11 For example, subprime lending is generally characterized by more reliance on direct
marketing by lenders and shopping for an ‘‘accept’’ on the part of borrowers, while
prime lending is more typically characterized by a softer sell on the part of lenders and
price shopping on the part of borrowers. This reﬂects the substantially different business
environments of the two markets.
12 Minorities are disproportionately represented in FHA lending. However, as a
consequence of limiting the data to conventional loans, there are no FHA mortgages in
the analysis, so no potential pricing differentials in that market were explored.
13 Additional variables are available from some, but not all, of the lenders contributing to
the analysis.
14 See Berkovec and Zorn (1996) for a discussion of the representativeness of the HMDA
data.
15 For the HMDA data comparisons, prime lenders in 2004 are deﬁned as those with less
than 30% of their mortgage originations with reported rate spreads, and in 2005 as those
with less than 45% of their mortgage originations with reported rate spreads. The HMDA
data are restricted to ﬁrst lien, purchase and reﬁnance, single-family, conventional
originations only. If borrower race/ethnicity is unknown, the loans were excluded.
16 Out of the total of 576 cells, there were 13 in 2004 with a zero loan count in the HMDA
data, and in 2005 there were 8 with a zero loan count. The proprietary lender data had
an additional 81 cells with a zero loan count in 2004, and an additional 130 cells with
a zero loan count in 2005. To address the fact that the proprietary lender data did not
fully span the support for the HMDA data, the ‘nearest neighbor’ cells were collapsed
until there were no cells with zero loan counts in the proprietary lender data that did
not also have zero loan counts in the HMDA data. This results in a total of 482 post-
sampling weights in 2004 and 438 post-sampling weights in 2005. In the vast majority
of instances, only the highest or lowest income cells were collapsed with the middle-
income cell (e.g., combine the less than $20,000 cell with the between $20,000 and
$200,000 cell). Occasionally, the loan purpose cells also were combined.
17 The use of post-sampling weights does not affect the qualitative results. The unexplained
APR differentials in Exhibit 11 range from 8 to 11 basis points. Without the post-
sampling weights, the unexplained APR differentials range from 7 to 14 basis points.
18 With a sample size of over one million, all differences in Exhibit 2 are statistically
signiﬁcant at p-values less than 0.0001.
19 The larger importance of this component in 2005 is primarily due to the greater average
difference in subprime and prime APRs in 2005.
20 For a discussion of these issues see, for example, Mahoney (1998). As Mahoney notes,
fair lending laws regarding disparate impact also require the search for a less
discriminatory alternative, but the discussion and analysis of this point is beyond the
scope of the current research.
21 For a further discussion of these points, see Ross and Yinger (2006).
22 For a discussion of switching regression models and their estimation see, for example,
Maddala (1983).
23 The beginning of a unit variance for the error term is assumed because the estimation
technique (Probit) identiﬁes MODEL1 parameters only up to a normalization with respect
to the standard error of the error terms.436  Courchane
24 The dummy variable approach results in unexplained APR differentials (presented in
Exhibit 11) ranging from 8 to 11 basis points. The unexplained APR differentials range
from 8 to 13 basis points when all model coefﬁcients are allowed to vary over borrower
race/ethnicity.
25 When the explanatory variables exclude tract mortgage denial percentage, tract
percentage owner-occupied, and tract percentage subprime originations in the previous
year, unexplained APR differentials range from 10 to 15 basis points. Adding to
these exclusions the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index further increases the unexplained
differentials to a range of 12 to 21 basis points. However, even with all four exclusions,
over 80% of the raw APR differential for African American borrowers is explained by
the models and over 70% of the raw differential for Hispanic borrowers is explained.
A less radical approach to addressing the possible over-inclusion of variables is to
subtract race/ethnicity-speciﬁc means from these four potentially problematic variables
in an effort to ‘purge’ any correlation with borrower race/ethnicity. Doing so results in
unexplained APR differentials that range from 12 to 17 basis points, and explain over
85% of the raw APR differential for African American borrowers and over 80% of the
raw differential for Hispanic borrowers.
26 The results are robust to these identiﬁcation exclusions. Speciﬁcally, a system where the
additional variables in MODEL1 are also included in MODEL2 and MODEL3 is also
estimated, along with a system where the variables are excluded in all three models. As
well, we separately estimate systems where each of our excluded variables is included
one at a time in MODEL1. In all instances, the estimated correlation coefﬁcients are
very similar to those presented in Exhibits 9 and 10, and the APR differentials are very
similar to those presented in Exhibit 11.
27 LTV, DTI, and loan amount are the variables most generally considered to raise
endogeniety concerns. To address endogeniety concerns, a more reduced form version
of the model that excludes these three variables while adding borrower income as a
percentage of area median income is estimated. The resulting APR differentials of this
alternative speciﬁcation are very similar to those presented in Exhibit 11.
28 For a discussion of the movestay command, see Lokshin and Sajaia (2004).
29 This is the decomposition ﬁrst proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
30 The authors thank Glenn Canner for his suggestion to include the HHI and the tract
denial percentage.
31 The HHI is constructed as the sum of squared market shares of ﬁrms in a tract. As such,
the index ranges from 10,000 in the case of 100% market concentration to near zero in
the case of many ﬁrms with equally small market shares.
32 The nonlinear nature of the inverse Mills ratio terms in Equations (6) and (7) ensure
system identiﬁcation. Identiﬁcation is enhanced, however, by including variables in the
probit model of market determination that are excluded in the models of subprime and
prime APR determination as expressed in Equations (4) and (5). As noted previously,
the results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.
33 In these exhibits, splined variables are treated as categorical, with the categories deﬁned
by each segment of their linear spline.
34 As a robustness test, the subprime and prime observations were also combined and a
simple OLS regression of APR was run. The unexplained APR differential for African
American borrowers is 15 basis points for both 2004 and 2005, and for Hispanic
borrowers it is 9 basis points in 2004 and 15 basis points in 2005.The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans  437
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35 See, for example, LaCour-Little (2007) on this point.
36 The unexpected result in the prime market may be due to the way in which APR
calculations treat discount points. Speciﬁcally, subprime borrowers are more likely to
be income constrained, and so may be more likely to lower their mortgage contract rates
by paying points and ﬁnancing them through an increased mortgage balance. APR
calculations discount points over the full length of the loan term (typically 30 years),
while the market typically uses the expected life of the loan (2 to 10 years) in
establishing the pricing trade-off between points and contract rate. The result is that the
APR calculation undervalues points relative to the market. All things equal, therefore,
borrowers taking out points will tend to have lower APRs than borrowers who do not.
Since subprime borrowers are more likely to take out points, borrowers actually taking
out prime mortgages likely will tend to have higher APRs than would random borrowers
given a prime mortgage.
37 Some critics have argued that subprime borrowers are forced/required to take out
prepayment penalties, suggesting that this variable is more the ‘‘result of’’ rather than
the ‘‘cause of’’ taking out a subprime mortgage. Similar concerns have been expressed
regarding contract rate type. To address these concerns, estimations excluding these
variables from the subprime probability model were also run while continuing to include
them in the subprime and prime APR models. Not surprisingly, excluding these variables
reduces the predictive power of the subprime model, and so results in somewhat larger
unexplained APR differentials. The change is biggest for Hispanic borrowers, but even
here the model explains roughly 75% of the raw APR differential. For African American
borrowers, the reduced model explains roughly 90% of the raw APR differential.
38 There are slight differences between the values in Exhibit 2 and equivalent values in
Exhibit 11, since Exhibit 11 values incorporate adjustments for endogeneity and
nonlinear components to their predictions.
39 With the exception of differences in subprime probabilities for Hispanic and White non-
Hispanic borrowers with Hispanic characteristics, all differences in Exhibit 11 are
statistically signiﬁcant.
40 There is a component of art in determining the variables to appropriately include on the
estimations. The results of many individual tests demonstrate the robustness of the
ﬁndings to alternative variable speciﬁcations. A ﬁnal relatively comprehensive such
test is to: (1) address concerns that the possible over-inclusion of variables correlated
with borrower race/ethnicity may downward-bias unexplained APR differentials by
subtracting race/ethnicity-speciﬁc means from the set of potentially problematic
variables (tract HHI, tract mortgage denial percentage, tract percentage owner-occupied,
and tract percentage subprime originations in previous year) to ‘‘purge’’their correlation,
and (2) restrict from the market determination model the prepayment penalty and
contract rate type variables because of concerns that they are ‘‘caused’’ by the
determination of subprime versus prime market rather than the reverse. Not surprisingly,
these adjustments increase the unexplained APR differentials, primarily because of the
resulting model’s reduced ability to explain the probability of taking out a subprime
mortgage. Nonetheless, this arguably over-simpliﬁed model explains over 80% of the
raw APR differential for African American borrowers, and roughly 70% of the APR
differential for Hispanic borrowers.
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